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Business and Financial Method Patents,  
Innovation, and Policy 
Bronwyn H. Hall1 
1 Introduction 
The explosion in business method patent applications and grants that occurred in 1999-2001 has 
abated somewhat, and the legal landscape has changed as a result of several court decisions. However, the 
many policy questions raised by the response of the financial, e-commerce, and software industries to the 
well-known State Street Bank decision on the patentability of business methods remain. Many scholars, 
both legal and economic, wrote on this topic shortly after the decision and the accompanying increase in 
patents in this technological area.2 Although much of this literature provides a fairly thorough analysis of 
individual cases and what they signify, there was relatively little literature on the impact of business 
method patents based on a more broad-based or empirical approach. Notable exceptions to this are a 
series of studies of financial method patents by Lerner (2001, 2006a,b) and some studies of business 
method patents by Allison and Tiller (2003), Hunt (2008), Wagner (2008), and Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi 
(2009) .  
The current paper reviews the evolution of patenting in this area and reviews some of the 
literature on patents more broadly in an attempt to infer the implications of this literature for business 
method patents. The focus is on two issues: the role of patents in encouraging innovation and the 
consequences of low patent quality for the performance of the system. I begin by reviewing the facts 
about business method patents briefly, and then survey what economists know about the general 
relationship between patent systems and innovation, in order to draw some implications for the likely 
impact of business method patents on innovation in industry. A discussion of the patent quality issue is 
followed by a summary of the policy recommendations made by those who have followed the evolution 
of legal standards as both software and business methods have become acceptable subject matter. 
                                                     
1
 University of California at Berkeley, University of Maastricht, and NBER. This is a substantially revised 
and expanded version of a paper prepared for the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank Conference on Business Method 
Patents, Sea Island, Georgia, April 3-5, 2003 and the EPIP Network Conference on New Challenges to the Patent 
System, Munich Germany, April 24-25, 2003. Comments from participants in those conferences are gratefully 
acknowledged.  
2
 See, for example, Bakels and Hugenholtz (2002), Bessen and Maskin (1997), Blind et al (2001), 
Cockburn (2001), Cohen and Lemley (2001), Davis (2002a,b), Dreyfuss (2000), Hart et al (1999), Hunt (2001b), 
Kasdan (1999), and Lerner (2001). 
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Most economists view the patent system as a necessary evil: with a patent grant we trade off short 
term exclusive (monopoly) rights to the use of an invention in return for two things: 1) an incentive to 
create the innovation; and 2) early publication of information about the innovation and its enablement. 
The argument is that without the patent system, fewer innovations would be produced, and those that 
were produced would be kept secret as much as possible to protect the returns from misappropriation. 
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) expand on this analysis and provide two further related arguments for the 
existence of a patent system: it serves as an inducement for the needed investments to develop and 
commercialize inventions, and it enables the “orderly exploration of the broad prospects” opened up by 
particularly novel inventions. In considering the economic impacts of the implicit subject matter 
extension implied by the increased use of patents to protect business methods, the tradeoff between these 
benefits and the welfare cost of the grant of a monopoly right are at least as important as they are in any 
other technological arena.  
As our understanding of the uses and abuses of the patent system has grown, other benefits (to 
competition) and costs (to innovation) have emerged as important. Table 1 summarizes the basic dilemna: 
the patent system can generate both benefits and costs, for both innovation and competition. Economic 
analysis says first that competition may suffer when we grant a monopoly right to the inventor of a 
business method but it will benefit if this right facilitates entry into the industry by new and innovative 
firms, and allows the development of markets for technology. Second, innovation will benefit from the 
incentive created by a patent but may suffer if patents discourage or raise the cost of combining and 
recombining of inventions to make new products and processes. Thus the relationship between patents, 
competition, and innovation is guaranteed to be a complex one, and one that may vary over time and 
across industries.  
2 Background and history 
There is no precise definition of a business method patents, and in reading the literature it 
becomes clear that many scholars make little distinction between business method patents, internet 
patents, and software patents more broadly, at least when making policy recommendations. This is 
inevitable in the present day, because many business method patents are in fact patents on the transfer of a 
known business method to a software and/or web-based implementation, so the distinction is hard to 
maintain. In addition, almost all patent offices draw some kind of line between a method of doing 
something that does not have a “technical effect” (in the case of the EPO) or is not “tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus” or does not transform one thing to another (the USPTO after the in re Bilski 
decision) and a patentable business method. This line is inevitably fuzzy and has moved over time.   
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For the purpose of examination, the USPTO defines a business method patent fairly narrowly, as 
a patent classified in US patent class 705, defined as “data processing: financial, business practice, 
management, or cost/price determination.” Such patents are on methods used for a variety of purposes in 
business such as the following:3  
• Financial - credit and loan processing, point of sale systems, billing, funds transfer, banking 
clearinghouses, tax processing, and investment planning 
• Financial instruments and techniques – derivatives, valuation, index-linking 
• Optimization – scheduling and resource allocation 
• Marketing - advertising management, catalog systems, incentive programs, and coupon 
redemption  
• Information acquisition, human resource management, accounting, and inventory monitoring 
• e-commerce tools and infrastructure – user interface arrangements, auctions, electronic 
shopping carts, transactions, and affiliate programs 
• Voting systems, games, gambling, education and training 
Examples of business method patents are the well-known one-click patents assigned to 
Amazon.com, the Dutch auction patent of Priceline.com, and of course the Signature Financial patent on 
a system of managing multiple mutual funds in a single account that was the subject of the State Street 
decision described below.  
2.1 A brief legal history 
Statutory subject matter for patenting is defined by section §101 of the U.S. code as any new and 
useful machine, article, process, or composition of matter. Precedents set during the long legal history of 
patentability have interpreted this definition to exclude laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas. It is the shades of difference in meaning between the definition of a “new and useful” item and an 
“abstract idea” that is the source of the debate surrounding business methods as a suitable subject matter 
for patentability and the difficulty in clearly delineating that subject matter. Clearly it is possible to 
imagine an abstract idea that is new and useful, so the exclusion rests on the inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of the words “machine, article, process, or composition of matter.”   
In 1998, the US Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a decision that is widely 
viewed as having opened the door to widespread business method patenting, especially financial methods, 
in the State Street Bank and Trust v Signature Financial Corporation case.4 The Signature patent at issue 
                                                     
3
 See the USPTO White Paper (1999) for further description and categorization of these patents.  
4
 State Street Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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was a “pure” number-crunching software program application, which implemented a method of valuing 
mutual funds.5 The Federal Circuit Court decision, authored by Judge Rich, stated clearly that section 
§101 of the US patent law is unambiguous - “any” means ALL, and it was improper to read limitation 
into 101 not intended by Congress. Therefore, mathematical algorithms are non-statutory only when 
“disembodied” and thus lacking a useful application. The court went on to make sure that the decision 
was precedent-setting by stating that with regard to the business method exception, “We take this 
opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.” 
In a subsequent case, AT&T v Excel, where the patent at issue contained a method claim about 
adding a data field to a record for use in a billing system, the Federal Circuit confirmed the State Street 
decision, saying that a physical transformation was not required for a method claim to be statutory and 
that mathematical algorithms were patentable if “embodied” in an invention. That is, the State Street 
decision applies to methods as well as to machines. 
Two recent cases have changed the landscape somewhat in the business patent area, making it 
somewhat more difficult to obtain such a patent and also more difficult to enforce the patent, once 
obtained. In a high profile case that ended in the Supreme Court, MercExchange sued e-Bay for 
infringement of a series of patents on computerized marketplaces. The decision in this case is widely 
viewed as shifting the bargaining point between a non-working patent holder and a potential infringer. In 
May 2006, the Court ruled that a four factor test must be used to decide whether to issue a permanent 
injunction in a patent case.6 Before an injunction is issued by the court, a patent owner must show (1) it 
has suffered irreparable injury; (2) monetary damages are inadequate compensation; (3) a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved. Applying this test should make it 
more difficult for patent holders that do not offer a product embodying the invention in question to obtain 
injunctions against those who do.  
The second important recent case is in re Bilski, which was decided by the Court of Appeals of 
the Federal Circuit in October 2008.7 This ruling addressed which technologies are eligible for patent 
protection, reinstating a test familiar from decisions in the 1970s and early 1980s, and to some extent 
stepping back from the State Street test of patentability (that the invention need only have a “concrete, 
                                                     
5
 The description of the patent in the court’s decision was that it was “generally directed to a data 
processing system (the system) for implementing an investment structure which was developed for use in 
Signature's business as an administrator and accounting agent for mutual funds. In essence, the system, identified by 
the proprietary name Hub and Spoke, facilitates a structure whereby mutual funds (Spokes) pool their assets in an 
investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership. This investment configuration provides the administrator of a 
mutual fund with the advantageous combination of economies of scale in administering investments coupled with 
the tax advantages of a partnership.” 
6
 http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf 
7
 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/07-1130.pdf 
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useful, and tangible result”). The new test for patentable software says that a process will be patentable if 
“(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different 
state or thing.” The Court expressed concern that a patent should not “pre-empt substantially all uses of a 
fundamental principle.” Besides the implications for algorithmic patents, the decision is also viewed as 
ruling out medical methods as patentable subject matter.  
Thus the set of patents that could be classified as business method or financial method patents 
will change over time as the subject matter definitions used by the USPTO change, either in response to 
court rulings, or to other changes, including legislative. At the current time, there are two main patent 
classes containing these patents: 705 (data processing: financial, business practice, management, or 
cost/price determination) and 902 (electronic funds transfer). It is of course possible that patents we might 
view as business method patents are classified elsewhere in the patent system. For example, patent 
number 5,851,117, which describes a training system for training janitors, is classified as 434, “education 
and demonstration.” and patent number 6,015,947, which describes a method of teaching music, is 
classified as 84, “music”. In this paper, I do not use patents in classes such as these, because the business 
method share of the class is quite small and it is not feasible to read each patent separately. The main 
patent classes that contain software and business method patents, broadly defined, are shown in Table 3. 
Among these classes, only 705 and 902 contain modern business method patents. About half of these are 
related to financial methods and payment services, and half to other business methods.8 
Figures 1 (by year of application) and 2 (by year of grant) give an idea of the relative importance 
of software and business method patents according to various patent class definitions. Under a broad 
definition of software/business methods, the USPTO is now granting about 10 to 12 thousand patents per 
year, as opposed to fewer than a thousand per year before 1985.9 Pure business method patents (those in 
class 705) are still a small share of the total, with about a 1000 granted per year, and with a notable 
decline in grants in 2001 and 2002 probably because of the second review of this class that was instituted 
by the USPTO.10 Figure 3 shows the evolution of class 705 patents: applications grow very slowly until 
                                                     
8
 I define financial and payment service patents as the union of definitions due to Hall (2007) and Lerner 
(2006): those 705 patents in subclasses 4, 14, 16-18, 21, 33, 35-45, 53-56, 64-79 plus any class 902 patents. See the 
appendix for a complete list of the subclasses. Although class 902 seems from its description to be a likely 
repository of many financial services patents, in fact there is only one patent with primary classification in 902 
granted by the end of 2006, which is when my data sample ends.  
9
 The definition used is the combined definition from Hall and MacGarvie (2007).  
10
 In discussion of this paper, Josh Lerner suggested that the decline may be partly due to strategizing on 
the part of firms to avoid having a potential business method patent classified into 705, so that it would not be 
scrutinized twice at the USPTO. This seems likely, but there is no way to measure this effect using publicly 
available data.  
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the in re Alappat decision of 1994, which was widely viewed as opening the door to “pure” software 
patents in the U.S. 
As the low numbers of some of the classes indicate, business method patents of some sort have 
existed for a long time, although not necessarily in large quantities. According to the USPTO (1999), the 
earliest business method patents were for methods of printing money and detecting counterfeit bills.11 A 
patent was issued in 1857 for the idea of including local advertising in a hotel register. Since the mid-
1990s, the numbers have increased substantially, largely due to the two previously mentioned court 
decisions and their aftermath, in re Alappat in 1994 and then State Street v. Signature Financial in 1998. 
Nevertheless, class 705 patents are still on the order of one half of one percent of all patents applied for, 
whereas software patents are now about 6 per cent  of all patents, using the Hall-MacGarvie combined 
definition (2007). For comparison, Hall et al. (2009) find that financial method patents are only about 
0.2% of patent applications and 0.1% of patent grants at the EPO during the 1995-2002 period.  
The success of the patentholder in the State Street and ATT v Excel cases clearly emboldened 
others who held patents on internet-based methods of doing business. Table 2 lists some of these patents 
and the disputes in which they were involved: they include the well-known one-click patent of Amazon, 
the Priceline name-your-price auction, and the widely critiqued Y2K windowing patent.12 The history of 
SSL public key encryption technology is instructive: the original patent (4,405,829) was granted to MIT 
in 1983 on an application in 1976 that had been blocked by another 1976 patent issued in 1980 to Cylink, 
a Stanford University spin-off. As SSL became the dominant technology in the area of secure websites, 
the IETF managed to persuade RSA Security (the MIT spin-off) to yield some IP to the public standard in 
the late 1990s. Then in  2001, Leon Stambler sued RSA Security and Verisign over his 1993 patents, 
which claimed to cover the SSL public key encryption. In 2005, RSA Security and Verisign were found 
not to have infringed the Stambler patents. Several other disputes of this kind ended in these patents being 
invalidated, but others led to settlements with undisclosed royalty payments. This illustrates both the 
complexity of the technology and the complexity of the disputes in the case of a valuable standard.  
Because many of the past cases have ended in some kind of settlement with undisclosed terms, so 
it is difficult to form a precise picture of the licensing royalties involved. It is, however, noteworthy that 
                                                     
11The first financial patent was granted on March 19, 1799, to Jacob Perkins of Massachusetts for an 
invention for “Detecting Counterfeit Notes.” Patent number X2301 was granted to John Kneass on April 28, 1815 
for a “A Mode of Preventing Counterfeiting.” The hotel register patent is number 63,889. See USPTO (1999). 
12
 This author was one of many who was incredulous when this patent, which solves the Y2K 2-digit year 
problem by redefining the base year, issued. Like some others, she had software (in this case, TSP) on the market 
using this method a good 15 years before patent 5,806,063 was applied for. The Patent Commissioner ordered a re-
examination of this patent in 1999, and a final rejection of all claims was issued on June 10, 2005. After appeal, the 
rejection was finally affirmed by the USPTO Board of Appeals on March 16, 2009 (!). Among other things, this 
case illustrates the time and resources that can be consumed even by a dubious patent in this area.  
Bronwyn H. Hall  March 2009 
 7 
most of the cases concern internet patents rather than “pure” business method patents. Following Lanjouw 
and Schankerman (2001), this suggests that these are the high value and enforceable patents in this area. 
The more frivolous business method patents (such as 6,257,248, for cutting hair with scissors in both 
hands, or the previously mentioned 6,368,227, for a method of swinging on a swing) are probably 
unenforceable.  
2.2 Business method patenting outside the US 
According to the TRIPS agreement of the WTO, neither business methods nor software are 
specifically excludable subject matter for patentability (Diallo 2003). With respect to software, national 
treatment varies, but in most countries at least some types of software (especially those with a “technical 
effect” or where they are embodied in hardware) are now patentable.13 At the present time, business 
methods are patentable (with some restrictions) in the United States, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and 
possibly Korea, but not in Europe including the UK, and Canada. In the UK, for example, the Patent 
Office introduced special treatment for business method applications in November 2004, due to the 
increasing number that had little or no chance of being granted (MIP Week 2004). In so doing, the 
Director cited applications from Fujitsu for optimizing the scheduling of airline crews, and a system for 
managing a debt-recovering process as being inherently unpatentable. In general UK practice with respect 
to software patents is viewed by practitioners as more restrictive than that at the EPO (MIP Week 2007). 
Several researchers have looked at various types of business method patents applied for or 
granted at the European Patent Office (EPO). Wagner (2008) examined 1901 EPO applications that had 
granted US equivalents in class 705, finding that these patents had more claims and a longer pendency 
than other patents, and were mostly taken out by large US and Japanese electronic and computer firms. 
About 70 per cent of them are granted (fewer for US applicants) and of those granted, 16 per cent were 
opposed, a relatively high rate. The most interesting finding was very active opposition (44 per cent of 
granted patents) in a single technology area dominated by one American (Pitney-Bowes) and three 
European firms: franking devices. The fact that Pitney-Bowes, by far the largest patentholder, was the 
opposed and the other three firms the opposers in most cases suggests that these competitors (Societe 
Secap, Neopost Ltd, and Francotyp-Postalia) feared being locked out of technologies they were already 
using without having patented them.  
Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi (2009) study financial method patents at the EPO, using a variety of 
definitions to identify them. They find that the majority are held by large established firms in non-
                                                     
13
 See Spindler (2003) for a useful discussion of the current state of play in Europe, and EC (2002) for the 
draft European directive on software patent policy.  
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financial sectors, as Lerner (2001) found for the United States and Wagner found for Europe. Decisions 
on these patent applications take longer and they are more likely to be rejected, suggesting uncertainty 
over subject matter eligibility along with value to the applicant. As Wagner found for the subset of these 
patents with US equivalents, they are more likely to be opposed once issued, consistent with the fact that 
their other value indicators such as citations are also higher than for patents as a whole.  
It would be interesting to ask whether the difference in treatment of business method and 
financial patents at the USPTO and the EPO has made any difference for business method and internet 
innovation in the two sets of countries. Unfortunately, this particular research has not yet been 
undertaken, probably because it is still too early for there to be much evidence and also because there are 
other confounding influences which make the comparison difficult. Thus I turn to the empirical evidence 
on the effects of having a patent system on innovation in general in the next section of the paper. 
3 Does the patent system increase innovative activity? 
Although almost the holy grail of innovation policy research, this question has proved 
exceedingly difficult to answer due to the absence of real experiments. As I suggested in the introduction, 
economic theory does not supply an unambiguous answer to the question, so that it is essential to rely on 
empirical observations where a patent system has been introduced, eliminated, or changed in major ways. 
In this section of the paper, I first review the theoretical results briefly and then turn to the empirical 
evidence on innovation and the patent system.  
3.1 Theoretical results  
The first result from theory is the well-known argument that granting a patent on an innovation 
will both incent the inventor, raising welfare, and create a temporary monopoly with its attendant 
deadweight loss. This rather stark result is mitigated somewhat by two observations: the first is that 
inventors are often motivated by a variety of factors, not all of which are financial. The second is that 
innovators are often creative in securing returns to their inventions even in the absence of a patent by 
bringing the innovation to the market speedily and by secrecy. Based on these observations, we might 
expect the patent system to be an important incentive system when 1) considerable funds are needed to 
develop an invention, as in the case of pharmaceuticals or complex modern information technology, and 
2) it is difficult to keep the innovation secret, or imitation is easy.  
More recently, a number of theorists beginning with Scotchmer (1991, 1996) and Green and 
Scotchmer (1995) have stressed the negative effects of patenting in industries with cumulative or 
sequential technology where each innovation builds on the last, as well as the impossibility of getting the 
incentives right unless there is enough information to enable contracts to be written before the first 
Bronwyn H. Hall  March 2009 
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invention. Incentives to develop follow-on innovation in these industries are reduced by the need to pay 
licensing fees to the earlier inventors. In principle, for industries with very complex technologies, the 
problem of contracting for many small pieces of technology may be so severe that transactions costs 
discourage invention altogether (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Grindley and Teece 1997).  
For my purposes here, the work of Bessen and Maskin (2006) and Hunt (2001a) are probably the 
most directly appropriate. Bessen and Maskin use a model of sequential innovation where each invention 
builds on the preceding to show that patent protection does not encourage innovation as much as in the 
static non-sequential setting, and may even discourage it. Hunt modeled sequential innovation along with 
a variable standard of patentability (non-obviousness) and asked how a patent system is likely to impact 
innovation in this case. He assumes an environment where the profitability of inventions is continuously 
eroded by the introduction of new, competing technologies and where the strength of the nonobviousness 
requirement for obtaining a patent determines the proportion of new discoveries that do not affect the 
profits earned by older proprietary discoveries. He then analyzes the consequences of lowering the 
nonobviousness requirement, showing that there are two competing effects: a static effect in which R&D 
incentives are increased because more inventions are patentable and a dynamic effect in which incentives 
are decreased because the profit from any given invention is lower since it will be replaced more quickly.  
Two conclusions are drawn from this analysis: 1) there exists a unique standard of 
nonobviousness that maximizes the rate of innovation in a given industry; and 2) contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, reductions in the nonobviousness requirement are more likely to encourage 
innovation in industries that innovate slowly than in industries that innovate rapidly. The implication is 
that in rapidly innovating industries where each new product builds on others, welfare is more likely to be 
enhanced by having a high hurdle for obtaining a patent. O’Donoghue (1998) uses a slightly different 
model of sequential innovation and draws a similar conclusion, that increasing the standard of 
patentability can increase R&D as firms go after larger innovations, even though the overall cost of 
obtaining a patent has risen.  
As a general rule, the theoretical work discussed here has abstracted from the frictions introduced 
by uncertain patent validity, transaction costs such as those needed to negotiate licenses, and the costs of 
litigation for infringement and validity that arise either because of bargaining breakdown or real 
uncertainty about the patentability. Yet there is considerable anecdotal (Federal Trade Commission 2003) 
and some empirical evidence (e.g., Lerner 1995) that these frictions can be an important component of the 
cost of a patent system, and hence more patents or lower quality patents may be a drag on innovation 
because they increase transactions costs without increasing innovation incentives. In a recent article, 
Farrell and Shapiro (2008) consider the problem of uncertain validity and show that when downstream 
firms compete with themselves or with the upstream firm that holds the patent, social welfare is improved 
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by determining the validity of the patent before licensing. As they conclude, weak patents can be 
surprisingly strong.  
The main conclusion from theoretical work in this area is that whether patents are a socially 
useful way to encourage innovation turns on the characteristics of the innovation process and the 
complexity of the products which “read on” the patents. For this reason, I now turn to a review of the 
empirical evidence on the question.   
3.2 Empirical evidence 
Most researchers who have investigated the question of innovation and the patent system 
empirically have looked at historical eras when there were changes to the system and examined the 
consequences for subsequent innovative activity. Recently there have been a pair of studies that use 
mainly 19th century data (when there was substantial variation across countries in patent systems). One 
uses invention data from World’s Fairs and Expositions and one uses patenting itself as the innovation 
measure.  
Moser (2005) finds that inventors in countries without a patent system do not innovate more than 
inventors in countries with patent systems. However, inventors in countries without patent systems do 
tend to innovate in areas that are more easily protected with trade secrecy. Lerner (2002) finds that when 
a country strengthens its patent system, inventors from other countries patent more in that country. 
However, inventors from the country itself do not appear to invent more – they neither patent more in 
their own country, nor in Great Britain (which was chosen as a reference country, because it was a very 
important market in the 19th century and one with a well-functioning patent system that was widely used). 
Results using data from the 20th century are harder to find, but survey evidence exists. The first 
study was probably that by Mansfield (1986), who surveyed 100 U. S. manufacturing firms in the early 
1980s, finding that patents were important for innovation only in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, 
although firms in all sectors reported that they patented more than half of their patentable inventions. This 
basic result has held up to the present day.  
The Carnegie-Mellon and Yale surveys (Cohen et al 2000 and Levin et al 1987) demonstrate 
fairly clearly that patents are NOT among the important means to appropriate returns to innovation, 
except perhaps in the pharmaceutical industry. Similar results have been obtained by other researchers for 
Europe and Japan. Arundel (2001) reports the results of the PACE survey of large European firms, 
accounting for more than 75% of the patenting in Europe. In both the United States and Europe, firms rate 
superior sales and service, lead time, and secrecy as far more important than patents in securing the 
returns to innovation. Patents are usually reported to be important primarily for blocking and defensive 
purposes.  
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Using a somewhat more complex economic model and the same survey evidence, Arora, 
Ceccagnoli, and Cohen (2003) find that the patent premium, which they describe as the difference in 
payoffs to patented and unpatented inventions net of patent application costs, is not positive on average 
except for the medical instruments sector. Nevertheless, selecting on those inventions that actually are 
patented, the premium is generally positive and provides an incentive for R&D that is considerable in the 
health-related industries and still positive in other sectors.    
The most positive results are those obtained using time series-cross section data at the country 
level. Unfortunately such studies are rarely free of the criticism that the relationship between innovative 
activity and patenting at the country level is largely simultaneously determined and not causal. In a 1997 
paper using aggregate data across 60 countries for the 1960-90 period, Park and Ginarte find that the 
strength of the IP system (an index based on coverage, especially whether pharmaceuticals are covered; 
membership in international agreements; lack of compulsory licensing and working requirements; 
strength of enforcement; and duration) is positively associated with R&D investment in the 30 countries 
with the highest median incomes (that is, G-7 and other developed countries, mostly in Europe). In the 
other countries, the relationship is positive but not significant. Unfortunately their estimates are cross-
sectional and not corrected for the simultaneity (reverse causality) between doing R&D and having a 
patent system, which may explain why they are so different from those of Moser and Lerner. Similar 
results are reported by Kanwar and Evenson (2003), who also did not control for simultaneity. 
Using a database of 26 countries whose pharmaceutical patenting laws changed between 1978 to 
2002 and propensity score matching techniques, Qian (2007) provides a more nuanced view. There was 
no evidence that the change itself had an impact on innovative activity, measured as cite-weighted 
patents, R&D, or pharmaceutical exports. However, countries with higher levels of education, 
development, and economic freedom did experience an increase in innovation. That is, there was an 
interaction effect, but this effect diminished at the highest levels of patent protection, suggesting that an 
intermediate level was optimal.  
Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) studied the effects of expanding patent scope in Japan in 1988. 
According to the Japanese firms and patent attorneys that they interviewed, a statutory change that 
allowed multiple claims per patent (as has always been true in the U.S.) had the effect of increasing patent 
scope in Japan. They found that this change to the patent system had a very small positive effect on R&D 
activity in Japanese firms.  
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) looked at a single industry (semiconductors) that doubled its patenting-
R&D rate after the creation of the CAFC and other changes to patent legislation in 1982. Interview 
evidence suggested that the increase was due to the fact that inventions in this industry use technology 
that is covered by hundreds of patents held by a number of firms, and that firms increasingly feared 
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litigation and preliminary injunctions if they failed to have cross-licensing agreements in place. 
Negotiating such agreements was greatly facilitated by having a large patent portfolio of your own, so 
several firms, large and small, were engaged in defensive drives to increase their patenting rate. This had 
little to do with encouraging innovation, and in fact looked like a tax on innovative activity. The result 
also highlights the fact that the one product/one patent model of innovation is very far from the reality in 
many industries.  
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) also noted another effect of stronger patents in the semiconductor 
industry: it appears to have facilitated the entry of pure “design” firms, those which produce 
semiconductor designs but do no manufacturing. This fact was supported both by interview evidence 
(executives reported that patents were important for securing venture capital financing where there were 
few other assets) and by the fact that the share of design firms in the industry went from approximately 
zero per cent in 1982 (before the strengthening of the system) to 30 per cent in 1995.  
Several conclusions emerge from this survey of empirical work on the effects of the patent 
system on innovation. Although introducing or strengthening a patent system (lengthening the patent 
term, broadening subject matter coverage, and so forth) usually results in an increase in patenting, it is not 
clear that these changes result in an increase in innovative activity at all times and in all places. If there is 
an increase in innovation due to patents, it is most likely to be centered in the pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology, and medical instrument sectors, and possibly also specialty chemicals. Patents in many of 
these areas are relatively easy to define, because they are based on molecular formulas, and therefore also 
relatively easy to enforce. Thus empirical research supports those who argue that a unitary patent system 
is far from optimal for supporting innovation.   
The most interesting and not immediately obvious conclusion is that the existence and strength of 
the patent system has a tendency to affect the organization of industry, by allowing trade in knowledge 
and facilitating the vertical disintegration of knowledge-based industries and the entry of new firms that 
possess only intangible assets. It is very clear that this particular feature of the patent system has been 
important with respect to business method and internet patents. In many (but by no means all) cases, the 
first step taken by an inventor/entrepreneur with an idea for an internet-based business model is to attempt 
to acquire a patent on it, and certainly one of the first questions asked by the venture capitalist he 
approaches for financing is whether the startup owns patents on its technology.14  
                                                     
14
 See Mann and Sager (2007) for more detail on the use of patents by venture-backed software startups, 
which is by no means universal, and varies considerably within the software sector. Also see Merges (2003) on the 
possible implication of financial patents.  
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3.3 Implications for business method innovation 
What does the body of literature just surveyed have to say about the implications of allowing 
business method patents on innovation in business methods and finance? The only conclusion that is 
certain is that allowing business method patents will cause an increase in the patenting of business 
methods, one we have already experienced. And along with this increase in patenting, especially one that 
introduces patents of less certain quality, comes an increase in litigation, raising the costs of the system as 
a whole. It is noteworthy that Lerner (2006b) found that the probability of a lawsuit involving a financial 
patent held by a small entity is above unity, which suggests both that these patents are relatively valuable 
and that the primary role played by them is the collecting of royalties from other firms.15 Overall, he 
found that the lawsuit rate for financial patents awarded between 1976 and 2003 was about 30%, to be 
compared with the relatively low overall rate of 1-2% reported by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001). As 
Farrell and Shapiro (2008) have shown, even weak patents whose validity is uncertain can be surprisingly 
effective in litigation.  
Unfortunately, although we can be confident that the use of patents will increase when they are 
allowed, it is much more difficult to make predictions about the effects of this subject matter expansion 
on innovation that are not pure speculation. We know that patents are not considered essential for 
capturing the returns to innovation in many industries, and there seems no reason to think that this one is 
different. Casual observation suggests that business method patents are not being used to provide 
innovation incentives as much as they are being used to extract rents ex post, but this evidence could be 
misleading. We do not know whether there would have been as much entry into internet businesses or 
new financial offerings in the absence of the patent system, or even whether such entry is a good or a bad 
thing (recent difficulties among innovative financial firms suggest the latter possibility).  
A recent study by Duffy and Squires (2008) discusses the tradeoff between secrecy and patenting 
for financial innovations in sophisticated trading mechanisms, valuation metrics, or innovative financial 
products, suggesting that as transparency becomes more important to regulators, the desirability of 
patenting may increase. However, at the present time, such inventions are not generally protectable 
outside the US, so patenting is less attractive, as it enables easy imitation of an intangible product that can 
be produced anywhere in the world. Duffy and Squires then looked at 100 patents issued in class 705/35 
(Finance – banking, investment, or credit) during 2008 and concluded that only a handful were for such 
sophisticated new financial products, suggesting that either that these are not yet being patented, or that 
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 More precisely, Lerner found that firms with employment less than 200 in the year a patent was awarded 
experienced 1.153 lawsuits per patent, adjusted for the grant and suit lags.  
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they are still stuck in the patent office.16 Kumar and Turnbull (2008) provide a model of the decision to 
patent in this case, suggesting that it depends to a great extent on the extent to which there is a need to 
develop a market for the new product, which would involve revealing the idea to potential imitators.  
In a slightly different technology area, one possible evolution of practice in the banking and 
financial services industry can be hypothesized, however. This industry depends heavily on secure 
communication and transactions exchange among banks and brokerage houses, and such communications 
depend on standards, that is, they depend on different institutions communicating information to each 
other in exactly the same way. The industry carries out millions of such transactions daily and requires a 
very high level of accuracy, which implies a need for highly stable common standards. If components of 
new transactions’ standards or particular ways of doing things are patented by many different institutions, 
it is possible that a situation could develop like that in the semiconductor/computer industry, where it is 
necessary to have a portfolio of patents for cross-licensing purposes. This in turn may raise the cost of 
doing business and make it harder for new firms to enter without access to the requisite intellectual 
property.  
I close this discussion with the observation by Merges (2003) about the potential consequences of 
the introduction of patenting into the financial sector, which has not been welcomed by the established 
large players in that sector. According to Merges, two other U.S. industries (railroads in the 19th century 
and commercial software in the 20th) have previously greeted the arrival of patents on a large scale in their 
sectors with alarm and then learned to live with them, with no obvious decline in innovative activity or 
even profitability. As he puts it, “Perhaps patents overall simply do not affect the ‘big variables’ of 
economic life – industry structure, the basic pace of innovation, etc. - in such an industry to any great 
extent.” (Merges 2003, page 21).  
4 Patent quality17 
Many critics of the wave of business method patents in the first couple of years following the 
State Street decision have pointed to their low quality rather than their existence as the real policy 
problem (see Barton 2000, Dreyfuss 2001, and other references in Table 4). But what is meant by patent 
quality? The statutory definition of a patentable invention is that it be novel, non-obvious, and have 
utility.18 Both the economic and legal view suggest that high quality patents are those which describe an 
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 Note that because this type of patent is unlikely to be applied for outside the US and therefore will not be 
published at 18 months after application, the current seven year pendency means that a number of applications could 
be pending and not yet observed. 
17
 Parts of this section are drawn from Hall et al. (2003). 
18
 See Lunney (2001) for an argument that the non-obviousness test has been weakened since the creation 
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invention that is truly “new,” rather than an invention that is already in widespread use but not yet 
patented.19  
Besides the three statutory requirements, a fourth criterion for granting a patent on an invention is 
that the patent application must disclose sufficient details about the invention. These disclosures in the 
published patent can facilitate knowledge spillovers to others who might use or improve upon the 
invention. Another criterion for a “high-quality patent” therefore is that it enable those “skilled in the art” 
to comprehend the invention well enough to use the patent document for implementation of the described 
invention. This dimension of patent quality, however, is less likely to be affected by post-grant opposition 
proceedings. 
From a social welfare perspective, an important characteristic of a high quality patent is that there 
be relatively little uncertainty over the breadth of its claims, i.e., over what specific features of a technical 
advance are claimed under the terms of the patent, as well as whether these claims are likely to be upheld 
in legal proceedings following the issue of the patent. Uncertainty about the validity of a patent has 
several potential costs: such uncertainty may cause the patentholder to underinvest in the technology, it 
could reduce investment by potential competitors in competing technical advances, and it may lead to 
costly litigation after both the holder and potential competitors have sunk sizable investments. A recent 
book by Bessen and Meurer (2008) argues very clearly that lack of clear notice renders the patent right 
very unlike an ordinary real property right.  
4.1 Consequences of low patent quality 
Although some scholars, notably Lemley (2001), have argued that the costs of having higher 
quality patents may exceed the cost, recent experience suggests that there are some unintended 
consequences in the form of complicating property rights and feedback effects. In this section we review 
the arguments for increasing patent quality. 
 
“Low-quality patents” can create considerable uncertainty among inventors or would-be 
commercializers of inventions and slow either the pace of innovation or investment in the 
commercialization of new technologies. Lerner (1995) has shown that fear of litigation may cause smaller 
entrant firms to avoid areas where incumbents hold large numbers of patents. Such “entry-avoidance” 
may be rational and even welfare-enhancing if the incumbents’ patents are known for certain to be valid, 
but low quality patents held by incumbents may also deter entry into a technological area if the costs of 
invalidating the patents is too high. In these circumstances, technological alternatives may not be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982. 
19
 Presumably, if the invention has already been reduced to practice by others, the potential gain from 
incenting an inventor is zero, so we are left only with the deadweight loss from monopoly.  
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commercialized and consumer welfare suffers. Also, as Farrell and Shapiro (2008) argue, they can harm 
consumer welfare if used restrain downstream competition.  
The lack of relatively rapid processes for resolving patent validity and ensuring higher patent 
quality also may slow the pace of invention in fields characterized by “cumulative invention,” i.e., those 
in which one inventor’s efforts rely on previous technical advances or advances in complementary 
technologies. But if these previous technical advances are covered by patents of dubious validity or 
excessive breadth, the costs to inventors of pursuing the inventions that rely on them may be so high as to 
discourage such “cumulative” invention. Alternatively, large numbers of low-quality patents may 
dramatically increase the level of “fragmentation” of property rights covering prior-generation or 
complementary technologies, raising the transaction costs for inventors of obtaining access (e.g., through 
licenses) to these technologies (Shapiro 2001). Finally, the issue of a large number of low-quality patents 
will increase uncertainty among inventors concerning the level of protection enjoyed by these related 
inventions, which in turn will make it more costly and difficult for inventors to build on these related 
inventions in their own technical advances.  
The issuance of low-quality patents also is likely to spur significant increases in patent 
applications, further straining the already overburdened examination processes of the USPTO. A kind of 
vicious circle may result, in which cursory examinations of patent applications result in the issue of low-
quality patents, which triggers rapid growth in applications, further taxing the limited resources of the 
USPTO, further limiting the examination of individual applications, and further degrading the quality of 
patents. 
Decisions in the early 2000s by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the 
specialized appeals court for patent cases, concerning the validity of “important” patents (those deemed 
sufficiently valuable by patentholder or competitor to litigate and appeal) create still another reason for 
serious consideration of a nonjudicial process for post-issue validity challenges. For example, in 2002 the 
CAFC ruled that the PTO had incorrectly rejected two applications for “obviousness,” arguing that if an 
examiner rejects an application using “general knowledge,” that knowledge “must be articulated and 
placed on the record.”20 At the time, according to deputy commissioner Esther Kepplinger, this meant 
“we can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.”21 It is possible that decisions like this significantly 
weakened the level of scrutiny provided by the already costly and overcrowded patent-litigation system.  
                                                     
20
 This decision presumably made it more difficult to reject such patents as US 6368227, the patent on a 
swinging method that uses a technique known by children for years, but not placed “on the record.” Note that this 
particular patent has been subject to a re-examination request of the U.S. Patent Commissioner because of the 
publicity it received. The problem with patents like this is not necessarily that they are enforceable in the courts, but 
that they clog the system and raise its total cost.  
21
 As quoted on the Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2003. 
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The USPTO has responded both to critics of the quality of patents being issued and the increasing 
flood of patent applications in a number of ways. First, they introduced a second pair of eyes for the 
examination of business method patents in March 2000 and later extended it to other new technology 
areas. Second, in 2007, together with the Peer-to-patent project at the New York University Law School, 
they begin a pilot program that allows third parties to submit prior art for selected patent applications in 
the computing and business method areas that are in the system but not yet examined. It is clear that these 
initiatives have had some effect, both on the decline of 705 patents issuing that is visible in the data, and 
in the initial patent allowance rate, which has fallen from 70% in 2001 to 45% in 2008 (Crouch 2009).  
Finally, then Commissioner Dudas proposed a series of rules changes in 2008 that were designed 
to reduce the USPTO workload by discouraging continuation applications, requests for continued 
examinations, and applications with large numbers of claims. After litigation by inventors opposed to 
these changes, the CAFC allowed at least some of them to stand (Foley & Lardner LLP 2009).  
5 Survey of policy recommendations 
This section of the paper collects and organizes the many policy recommendations with respect to 
business method, internet, and software patents that have been made by other scholars, in an effort to find 
a consensus. Table 4 summarizes the recommendations of a number of legal and economic scholars. 
Several points emerge from this table and from a reading of the papers referenced. 
First, there is a remarkable amount of agreement, if not a consensus, that the average quality of 
patents being issued during the 1990s was too low, especially in the software and business method areas. 
There is also some agreement on the reasons: an overburdened patent office, lack of expertise in the 
relevant areas, lack of prior art databases, and the weakening of the non-obviousness test, partly through 
court decisions. 
Recommendations center on correcting these problems in software and business methods, 
although many of the suggestions would apply more broadly. Many authors suggest that standards of 
patentability and non-obviousness should be raised across all technologies, but especially in software and 
business methods (Barton 2000, 2001, Kasdan 1994, Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002, Lunney 2001, Quillen 
2001, Dreyfuss 2001, Meurer 2002). This recommendation appears to have been followed to some extent 
by the USPTO after about 2001, and was reinforced by the Supreme Court decision in KSR v Teleflex.22 
On the other hand, there is considerable variation in the recommendations with respect to subject 
matter extensions to software and business methods, ranging all the way from the AIPLA position that 
business methods receive the same treatment as other technologies to Thomas’ 1999 recommendation that 
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 KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
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subject matter be restricted to “the repeatable production or transformation of material objects.” 
Nevertheless, a number of legal scholars, including Dreyfuss, Meurer, and Bakels and Hugenholtz, have 
called for reinstatement of the business method exception. Again, to a limited extent this has happened 
with the Bilski decision.  
With respect to software more broadly, Lemley and O’Brien (1997) and Somaya (2001) have 
argued that patenting of software may have a beneficial effect if it leads to the reuse rather than the 
reinvention of software components as a result of patent publication rather than the use of secrecy to 
protect them. However, Lemley himself, along with Cohen, Warren-Boulton et al (1995), and Samuelson 
(1995) have recommended both narrow construction of patents for software and limited rights to reverse 
engineer in order to ensure interoperability and transparent interfaces.  
Finally, several authors have endorsed the idea that a greatly strengthened inter partes post grant 
re-examination system modeled on the European opposition system would encourage competitors and 
other third parties to bring forth prior art, especially in new subject matter areas where the PTO has 
inadequate searching facilities (Janis 1997, Levin and Levin 2002, Graham et al 2003, Hall et al 2003, 
Wegner 2001). The primary argument for such a system is that it would lead to invalidity determinations 
being made earlier and at less cost than the current system, which relies primarily on infringement suits 
accompanied by countersuits for patent validity. A second argument is that by housing validity 
determination within the patent office, useful feedback on the performance and accuracy of examination 
can be generated relatively quickly and communicated at somewhat lower cost than if it is generated by 
the courts. I refer the reader to Graham et al (2003) for further information on the comparative operation 
of the ex parte U.S. re-examination system and the inter partes European opposition system.  
6 Conclusions 
Broad evidence that the patent system encourages innovation always and everywhere is hard to 
come by. The patent system does encourage publication rather than secrecy; it is probably good at 
providing incentives for innovations with high development cost that are fairly easily imitated and for 
which a patent can be clearly defined (e.g., pharmaceuticals). When innovations are incremental and 
when many different innovations must be combined to make a useful product, it is less obvious that 
benefits of the patent system outweigh the costs. Business and financial methods are more likely to fall 
into the second class than the first.  
It is useful to think about recommendations for policy towards business methods patents in two 
very distinct levels: first, there is widespread agreement among legal scholars that the nonobviousness test 
has not been applied carefully enough in the case of internet and business method patents and that lack of 
prior art databases have led to many invalid patents issuing in software and business methods. Second, 
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some scholars go further and argue that business methods per se should be excluded from patentability, 
Judge Rich not withstanding. Given the number of such patents now outstanding, this outcome is 
unlikely.  
With respect to the former critique, a number of scholars have advanced the use of a strengthened 
post-grant re-examination system in order to encourage third parties to bring prior art to the attention of 
the patent office. Although the PTO recently strengthened the examination process with respect to these 
patents (USPTO 1999), some believe that this proposal still has some merit, especially if it could be used 
to weed out patents in these areas that were issued prior to the administrative changes at the patent office. 
In the meantime, legal decisions and the USPTO’s own actions seem to have mitigated the problems that 
arose following the State Street decision. 
Excluding business and financial methods per se from patentability, although perhaps desirable, 
is not really feasible given the difficulty of defining what they are. Even at the EPO, where there is a 
general exclusion, such patents do exist whenever the invention solves a particular technical problem. The 
language in the recent Bilski decision in the United States seems to move in that direction, and to exclude 
those patents with overbroad and vague claims which are perceived by many to be the main drag on the 
innovative system.  
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Effects on Benefits Costs
creates an incentive 
for R&D; 
impedes the 
combination of new 
ideas and inventions; 
promotes the diffusion 
of ideas 
raises transaction 
costs
facilitates entry of new 
small firms with limited 
assets; 
allows trading of 
inventive knowledge - 
markets for technology 
Innovation
Competition creates short-term 
monopolies, which 
may become long-term 
in network industries 
Table 1
Costs and benefits of the patent system
Patent 
number
Patent 
class
Issue 
Date Description Plaintiff Defendant Date Filed Court
Date 
Outcome of 
Action Outcome
4873662 711 1989 Hyperlink prototype patent British Telecom Prodigy (AOL, etc) Dec 2000 New York Sept 2002 Summary judgement; patent not valid; BT abandoned patent
5193056 705/36 1993
Data processing system for hub and 
spoke financial services 
configuration 
State Street Signature Financial 1994 Mass. 1998 State Street prevailed; business methods are patentable
5267314 713 1993 Public key encryption (SSL) Leon Stambler RSA Security, Verisign, etc Feb 2001 Delaware Trial began 2/26/03
5333184 379 1994
Call message recording for 
telephone systems (use of an 
algorithm to assing billing codes of 
IXCs in customer's records)
A T & T Excel Communications 1998 April 1999
CAFC reversed summary judgement, remanded to district 
court
5845265 705/37 1995 computerized market place for goods MercExchange Return Buy Sept 2001 VA, Eastern Dec. 2002
ReturnBuy settled for non-exclusive license, details not 
disclosed
5774870 705/14 1998 Online incentive/award systems Netcenter Carlson Companies; 
others CA, Northern
14 licensees with royalties of $6,000,000 per year 
collected by Netcenter
5794207 705/1 1998
(Dutch auction) method and 
apparatus for cryptographically 
assisted commercial network 
system designed to facilitate buyer-
driven conditional purchase offers
Priceline/Walker 
Digital Microsoft/Expedia Oct 1999 Connecticut Jan 2001 Settled with undisclosed royalty payments
5960411 705/26 1999 One-click internet shopping Amazon.com Barnes and Noble Oct 1999 Washington Mar 2002 Settled with royalties to Amazon.com
6009412 705/14 1999 online incentive/award systems Netcentives/Netcenter Carlson Companies; 
others CA, Northern
14 licensees with royalties of $6,000,000 per year 
collected by Netcentives
5848265; 
6085176;
6202051
705/37 2000
Use software search agents to 
comb multiple marketplaces; 
automated auctions
MercExchange eBay Sept 2001 VA, Eastern 2006 Supreme Court overturned CAFC injunction; settled with 
undisclosed royalty payments in Feb. 2008
5897620 705/5 1999
(Dutch auction) method and 
apparatus for the sale of airline-
specified flight tickets
Priceline/Walker 
Digital Microsoft/Expedia Oct 1999 Connecticut Jan 2001 Settled with royalties not disclosed.
5806063 707 1998 Y2K century windowing
McDonnell 
Douglas/Bruce 
Dickens
1999 Licensing letters 1999-2000; USPTO re-examined at inventor and PTO request, no outcome as of Feb. 2003
6368227 472 2002
swinging a swing sideways or in a 
circular motion instead of back and 
forth by pulling on the chains 
Steven Olson 2003 USPTO-requested re-exam; no outcome noted.
4698672 375 1986 JPEGlike compression standard Compression Labs/Forgent July 2002
Sony licensed the patent for $15M, other licenses have 
been asserted. The JPEG committee claims prior art 
invalidates the patent
5241671 707 1993 Multi-media search sustem with 
multiple paths (broad claims)
Compton's 
Encyclopedia / 
Britannica
July 2003 Re-examined at PTO request Dec/93, certificate issued July 2002 (!), with narrowed claims
5933841, 
6442574
715 
(was 
707)
1999 Structured document browser SBCommunications/A
meritech 30 licensing letters Feb 2003
prior art: Netscape 2.0 (1995); OWL International (1988) - 
first commercial hypertext system
Selected Software and Business Method Patent Disputes
TABLE 2
Selected re-examination requests
Examples of licensing letters requesting royalties
Infringement suits
2
Class Description
380 Cryptography
382 Image Analysis
395 Information Processing System Organization
700 Data Processing:  Generic Control Systems or Specific Applications
701 Data Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and Relative Location
702 Data Processing: Measuring, Calibrating, or Testing
703 Data Processing: Structural Design, Modeling, Simulation, and Emulation
704
Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language 
Translation, and Audio Compression/Decompression
705
Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price 
Determination
706 Data Processing: Artificial Intelligence
707
Data Processing: Database and File Management, Data Structures, or 
Document Processing
709
Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Multiple Computer 
or Process Coordinating
710 Electrical Computers and Digital Data Processing Systems:  Input/Output
711 Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Memory
712
Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems:  Processing 
Architectures and Instruction Processing (e.g., Processors)
713 Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems:  Support
715 Data Processing: Presentation Processing of Document
717 Data Processing: Software Development, Installation, or Management
902 Electronic Funds Transfer
TABLE 3
Patent Classes with Software or Business Method Patents
3
Author(s)* Date Type Recommendation(s)
Dreyfuss 2001
business 
method
Prior art search weak; generates low quality patents; Costs of business method patents greatly exceed 
benefits and they should be statutorily excluded
Merges 1999
business 
method business method patent flood and low quality patents issuing; calls for opposition system.
Meurer 2002
business 
method
PTO and the courts should use the subject matter and nonobviousness standards for patentability to limit 
grants of business method patents. Favors reversal of State Street and restoration of the business method 
exception. Short of reversal, argues for a narrow reading of State Street and rigorous application of the 
nonobviousness standard. 
Lunney 2001
business 
method
Federal circuit has gone too far in loosening non-obvious test, requiring written documentation. Should limit e-
commerce patents to those that are very creative (i.e., raise patentability standards)
AIPLA 2000
business 
method
Recommends that business methods with useful, concrete or tangible results, including Internet- and 
software-implemented business methods, receive the same treatment as other technologies. Where 
implemented in software, business method patent applications should be examined as software-related 
applications are examined today for compliance with 35 USC 101,102,103
Thomas 1999
business 
method
Restrict patentable advances to the repeatable production or transformation of material objects, and exclude
subject matter founded upon the aesthetic, social observation or personal skill. Consistent with TRIPS, the
industrial application requirement would restore a sense of patentable subject matter that matches our
sensibilities.
Wegner 2001
business 
method Favors opposition system modeled on Europe and Japan, also designated trail courts for patent cases
Bakels and Hugenholtz 2002 software
1) Stronger inventive step test; 2) Exclude Business Method patents "as such"; 3) Create a European Patent 
Observatory to monitor system performance
Cohen and Lemley 2001 software
1) Limited right to reverse engineer patented programs, in order to duplicate unprotected elements; 2) Courts 
should enforce doctrine of equivalents narrowly for software
Somaya 2001 software Software components should be reused, as in Lemley and O'Brien
Lemley and O'Brien 1997 software
Software patents will encourage the reuse of software components, because trade secrecy no longer 
necessary.
Dam 1995 software
Software patents sound, although badly adminstered by PTO. Sui generis protection for software not 
desirable
Samuelson 1995 software Recommends limited protection for software interfaces (sui generis)
Warren-Boulton, 
Baseman, and Woroch 1995 software
1) Copyright should not extend to de facto standards; 2) software interfaces should not be copyrighted, 
because of market power extension; 3) allow reverse engineering for interoperability
Kasdan 1994 software
Lack of computer science personnel among PTO examiners means prior art search incomplete, e.g. Knuth's 
book ignored; software patents undesirable
Kingston 2001 general
Lower cost of patent disputes in complex technologies via 1) Compulsory expert arbitration with legal aid; 2) 
Shared-risk compulsory licensing
Levin and Levin 2002 general Introducing a patent opposition process would give substantial welfare gains
Lemley  2001 general
Do not try to improve patent quality by increasing exam time, because PTO is "rationally ignorant," given cost 
of higher quality patents
Quillen 2001 general
1) Raise standards for patentability; 2) Reduce resulting uncertainty and delay in validity determination; 3) 
Reduce excessive damages in patent infringement litigation; 4) Return appellate jurisdiction to regional courts 
so alternative views can be heard on the same issue
Barton
2000
2001 general
1) Raise standards for patentability by using a real non-obviousness test; 2) Clarify research exemption; 3) 
Ease legal attack on invalid patents (strengthen re-exam, remove presumption of validity)
Janis 1997 general
Recommends an inter partes re-exam system modeled on trademark re-exam and similar to European 
opposition system
TABLE 4
Recent Recommendations on Patent Policy 
*Complete citations are given in the Reference section
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Figure 3
Business and Financial Method Patents granted by 2006
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